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Abstract 
In their role as agenda setters and implementers of political decisions, bureaucrats 
potentially have the power to influence decisions in their own favor. It is however 
difficult to empirically test whether bureaucrats actually are involved in such actions. In 
this paper we suggest and apply a new way of testing the hypothesis that bureaucrats 
can and do in fact affect policy to their own benefit. Making use of a discontinuity in 
the Swedish grant system, we estimate causal effects of intergovernmental grants on 
different types of personnel employed by the local governments. On the margin, we find 
a large, positive effect of grants on the number of bureaucrats in the central admin-
istration, but no effects on the number of personnel in other important sectors run by the 
local government (child care, schools and elderly care). These results support the view 
that bureaucrats are able to, and do indeed, affect the allocation of grants within 
municipalities to support own goals. 
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2  IFAU – Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power 1 Introduction 
Economic policy does not always turn out the way citizens desire. There are several 
reasons for this. For one thing, once in office politicians may have incentives to deviate 
from the promises that they made during the election campaign. Moreover, the decision 
of politicians are to be implemented by bureaucrats, i e civil servants in the central 
administration. These bureaucrats are often not only implementers but can potentially 
also impact politicians at the time of the actual decision-making. The purpose of this 
paper is to test whether they use this power to pursue own goals. 
That bureaucrats play an important role in the public decision-making process has 
long been recognized by economists.
1 In specific, there are two factors that give 
bureaucrats power over the decision-making process. First, bureaucrats are owners of 
information that other agents do not have access to. Second, the output produced by the 
public bureau is typically extremely hard to measure. In a world with uncertainty it is 
therefore close to impossible for any outside agent to monitor the performance of 
bureaucrats. From a voter’s point of view this difficulty is problematic, because in the 
same way as we expect individuals to maximize own utility, we would expect 
bureaucrats to use their power in order to maximize their own utility, which is not 
necessarily the same as maximizing voters’ utility. Of course, bureaucrats may also be 
motivated by other objectives, such as desires to create a good society, or to make the 
public decision-making as efficient as possible. Our view is that the issue of what 
motivates bureaucrats is yet to be convincingly settled. 
For the same reason that it is hard to monitor the behavior of bureaucrats, theories of 
bureaucratic behavior are intrinsically hard to empirically test. In this paper we suggest 
and apply one way of testing whether bureaucrats act so as to pursue own goals. Our 
strategy involves estimating causal effects of general, non-matching intergovernmental 
                                                 
1 Early contributions discussing the role of bureaucrats are Tullock (1965), Downs (1967), Niskanen (1971), and 
Romer and Rosenthal (1979). Later contributions include Moene (1986) that shows that deviations from the socially 
optimally bureau are likely. More recent authors argue that bureaucrats are driven by career concerns, see, e g, 
Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) and Alesina and Tabellini (2007). That bureaucrats matter for the political 
decision-making process as well as in the implementation phase has also been long recognized by the political 
science literature, see, e g, Peters (1995), Wilson (1989), and Lipsky (1980).  
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grants on different types of personnel employed by the local governments, including 
personnel in the central administration (which we in this paper denote as bureaucrats). 
This can be done thanks to detailed panel data on the number of employees in different 
local governmental sectors in Sweden 1996–2004. The idea is that we expect self-
interested bureaucrats to desire to increase the number of fellow bureaucrats.
2 There are 
several reasons as to why they should care about this; higher power against other 
groups, higher job security, lower work load etc. If bureaucrats pursue goals that are 
different from the electorate’s we would thus expect to see an asymmetric pattern, 
where an increase in grants leads to an increase in the number of bureaucrats employed, 
but not necessarily a corresponding increase in the number of other types of personnel.
3 
Therefore, if we find that the effects of grants are larger on bureaucrats than on 
personnel in other sectors, we interpret this as an indication that bureaucrats have an 
independent say in the decision on what to do with additional general grants, and that 
they use this power to increase own utility. 
The literature contains rather numerous studies that try to test the hypothesis that 
bureaucrats affect policy in their own interest. Several studies have compared costs 
between publicly and privately produced services, arguing that evidence indicating 
higher costs among public providers would support the view of bureaucrats as budget 
maximizers (for a list of studies along these lines, see Table 14.1 in Mueller, 1989). 
However, these comparisons hinge on the assumption that the quality of the output 
supplied by public and private suppliers is the same, which is questionable. Another 
way of testing whether bureaucratic power matters is to test different models against 
each other, one where bureaucrats matter and one where they do not. This is, for 
example, done by Romer and Rosenthal (1982), Filimon et al (1982) and Romer et al 
(1992), who take as starting point the asymmetric information model in Romer and 
                                                 
 
2 An alternative variable that the bureaucrats may want to affect is their own wages. However, given the Swedish 
setting with wage negotiations at the central level and only limited possibilities to set wages at the local level we 
believe that it is much easier for the bureaucrats to affect municipal labor demand than municipal wages. Also, it is 
potentially easier for the bureaucrats to argue that there is a need for more personnel rather than that there is a need 
for higher wages (or other materialistic things such as larger offices, for that matter). 
3 The line of reasoning applied in this paper, i e to indirectly look for patterns suggesting some sort of self-interested 
behavior, cheating, corruption or embezzlement when such activities are difficult to spot directly, has been used by 
others, e g, Card and Moretti (2007) who look for strategic behavior among U S politicians, Jacob and Levitt (2003) 
4  IFAU – Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power Rosenthal (1979). In this model, it is assumed that bureaucrats have more information 
about grants received than voters have, which leads to spending levels higher than those 
desired by the voters. Romer and Rosenthal (1982) find that school budgets in Oregon 
that are 16.5 up to 43.6 percent higher than the budget preferred by the median voter 
pass referenda. Such large departures from the median voter’s bliss point can pass since 
the bureaucrats are able to give a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to the voters in the 
referenda. Filimon et al (1982) develop the fiscal illusion model even further by 
explicitly modeling voters’ and bureaucrats’ (agenda-setters’) perceptions of inter-
governmental grants; while a voter might misperceive the actual grant level, an agenda-
setter is always assumed to have full knowledge of it. When testing the model, using the 
same data as in Romer and Rosenthal (1982), Filimon et al find that voters seem to be 
very poorly informed about grants received by the school district. As a consequence, 
school spending in Oregon is too high. Romer et al (1992) use data from New York 
school districts and link spending proposals to referendum outcomes. They find strong 
indications of budget maximization, especially in large districts. Other authors who test 
competing models of decision-making against each other are Shapiro and Sonstelie 
(1982) and Brueckner and O’Brien (1989). Shapiro and Sonstelie (1982) compare 
expenditures on general government, police, fire, and parks before and after the passing 
of Proposition 13 in 1978. Depending on whether the median voter or a budget-
maximizing bureaucrat had the decision-making power, the responses to the 
Proposition, which limited property tax amendments in California, would be different. 
Shapiro and Sonstelie find expenditure responses consistent with powerful bureaucrats. 
Brueckner and O’Brien (1989) test two models of wage bargaining, one where 
bureaucrats act in the interest of their constituents and one where bureaucrats act in their 
own interest. As opposed to earlier studies, they do not find any evidence in favor of the 
first model, i e no indications that bureaucrats try to maximize budgets.
4 
 
                                                                                                                                               
who look for cheating among teachers and school administrations, and Duggan and Levitt (2002) who look for 
corruption among Japan’s elite sumo wrestlers. 
4 Other studies trying to identify bureaucrats as budget maximizers are Ott (1980), McGuire (1981), Kalseth and 
Rattsø (1997), and Dahlberg and Mörk (2006). 
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The test suggested by us involves estimating causal effects of grants on personnel 
employed by the municipality. This is not straightforward since it is likely that grants 
are endogenous; see Besley and Case (2000) for a general discussion of endogenous 
policies, and Knight (2002), Gordon (2004), and Dahlberg et al (forthcoming) for a 
discussion of potential endogeneity of grants. In this paper, we will adopt a version of 
the identification strategy used by Dahlberg et al (forthcoming). The idea is to make use 
of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system where municipalities with a net out-
migration above two percent receive grants whereas municipalities with a net out-
migration below two percent do not. Since any direct effect of out-migration on 
personnel can be assumed to be smooth, the discontinuous variation that remains after 
controlling for the direct effects can be viewed as more or less random differences in the 
amount of grants received. Technically this exogenous variation is isolated by using the 
formula for the distribution of out-migration funds as an exclusion restriction in an IV-
estimation. The same type of identifying strategy has earlier been used by Guryan 
(2003) in a paper examining the effect of school resources on student achievement.
5  
On the margin, we find a large, positive effect of grants on the number of bureaucrats 
in the central administration employed by local governments, but no effects on the 
number of personnel in any of the other three important sectors run by the local 
government (child care, schools and elderly care). The asymmetries in these results can 
be taken as evidence of bureaucratic influence over the allocation of grants within 
municipalities – a conclusion that is strengthened by a detailed examination indicating 
that the instrument we employ in this paper is valid. When separating between the lower 
and the upper part of the distribution of influential bureaucrats, we find that the increase 
in the number of bureaucrats consists of administrative personnel rather than high 
officials. We can think of several reasons for why high officials would use their power 
to employ more administrative personnel. First, a large staff of administrators will be 
able to cover a variety of tasks that would otherwise be assigned to someone further up 
the ladder. Hence, by employing more administrative personnel, the high officials can 
                                                 
 
5 A grant non-linearity could potentially be analyzed with the regression-discontinuity method (see, e g, Angrist and 
Lavy, 1999; Hahn et al, 2001; Lee, 2008). The grant formula used in this paper differs however from a classical 
6  IFAU – Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power reduce their own work load. Second, having a large staff of administrators also 
increases the number that the higher officials are bosses over, which gives them more 
power. Finally, the scope for new appointments among high officials is likely to be 
rather restricted in municipalities of given size. 
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the strategy used 
to identify the causal effects of intergovernmental grants on bureaucrats and other types 
of local government personnel. Section 3 gives some facts about the Swedish system 
and discusses the role played by bureaucrats in Sweden. Section 4 presents the data, 
whereas section 5 gives the baseline results. Thereafter, a detailed examination of the 
validity of the instrument is given in section 6. Section 7 examines which type of 
bureaucrats that is employed as grants increase and, finally, section 8 offers concluding 
remarks. 
2 Identification  strategy 
We are interested in the causal effect of intergovernmental grants on different types of 
municipal personnel, i e the relationship we want to identify is given by 
 
(1)  ,0 1 , it it it yg , α α =+ + ε ,      
 
where  , it y  is the number of personnel employed by municipality i in year t in either 
administration, child care, schools, or elderly care, and  , it g  is grants received by the 
municipality. A (naïve) OLS-estimate of  1 α  will most likely be biased. The bias could 
be due to, e g, omitted variables and/or simultaneity of grants and personnel. Ideally, to 
eliminate the bias we would like to conduct an experiment were municipalities 
randomly are given different amounts of grants and then study their behavior. Since 
such an experiment does not exist (it seems quite politically infeasible) we turn to 
institutional details that allow us to come as close as possible to randomization of 
grants. Following Dahlberg et al (forthcoming), we will use a discontinuity in the 
                                                                                                                                               
regression discontinuity design in two respects. First, all treated do not receive the same amount and, second, there is 
no “jump” in treatment at the cut-off point. 
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Swedish cost-equalizing grant formula as a source of exogenous variation. The cost-
equalizing grants come with no strings attached (that is, municipalities can use the 
money in whatever way they prefer), and are intended to support municipalities that are 
characterized by demographic and other structural conditions associated with higher 
costs. We will return to the role played by these grants in sections 3 and 4. 
The component we use supports municipalities with a diminishing population and is 
allocated as follows: grants are distributed only to local governments with a net out-
migration larger than two percent the last ten years (with a two-year lag). More 
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where  is the net out-migration rate in municipality i between year t and year 
t-j whose size determines whether or not the municipality is treated with additional 
grants. Hence, in what follows 
(,) (, ) it it j m −−
(,) (, ) it it j m − − will be referred to as the “treatment-
determining covariate”. For those eligible for the out-migration grant the amount 
received is proportional to the out-migration rate.  
Figure 1 plots grants received by the municipalities against the rule. As can be seen 
from the figure, there is a well-defined cut-off at two percent where municipalities with 
lower net out-migration than two percent do not receive any grants whereas 
municipalities with net out-migration above two percent do receive grants.
6 Thus, there 
is a discontinuity in the relationship between grants and out-migration. 
                                                 
6 The total cost for this grant component is divided equally (per capita) between all municipalities, implying that it is 
neutral in terms of the federal budget. 























































Let the discontinuity in equation (2) be denoted by  ( ) (, 2 ) (, 1 2 ) it it m −− − Ω , where, again, 
 is the treatment-determining covariate. In order to get an unbiased estimate 
of 
(, 2 ) (, 1 2 ) it it m −− −
1 α  in equation (1) we use this discontinuity as an instrument for  , it g  in a two-stage 
procedure. However, since it is possible (and likely) that the treatment-determining 
covariate also partly determines the outcome of interest (i  e municipal personnel) 
directly, we need to control for this variable in the estimations. If not, the instrument 
will be invalid. Since we do not know the exact form of this direct effect we allow for 
an as flexible functional form as possible. This implies that the first stage in the two-
stage least squares (2SLS) procedure is given by 
 
(3)  () ( ) , 0 1 ( , 2) ( , 12) ( , 2) ( , 12) , ; it it it it it it gmf γ γη −− − −− − =+ Ω + + m φ , 
 
where  () f ⋅  is a smooth function of the treatment-determining covariate (net out-
migration)
7, and that the second step (where the relationship of main interest is 
estimated) consequently is given by 
                                                 
7 In the estimations, we use up to a fourth-order polynomial in m in the smooth function  ( ) f ⋅ . 
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(4)  ( ) , 0 1 , (, 2 ) (, 1 2 ) , ˆ ; it it it it it yg f α αε −− − =+ + + m δ , 
 
where   is predicted grants obtained from the estimation of equation (3).  ˆ g
Thanks to the discontinuity in the grant formula we are thus able to mimic an 
experimental setting quite closely. In terms of Figure 1, after controlling for the smooth 
direct effects of out-migration on personnel, municipalities on opposite sides of the kink 
are similar in all respects except that one is eligible for the grant and one is not. Any 
differences in personnel can therefore be attributed to essentially random differences in 
the amount of grants received. More formally, the exclusion restriction that is required 
for the instrument to be valid is that the functional form of the direct relationship 
between y and the treatment-determining covariate (as given by the smooth functions in 
lagged net out-migration) is not the same as the functional form of the relationship 
between the treatment-determining covariate and grants (as described by the 
discontinuous out-migration grant formula, i e the selection mechanism). It is worth 
noting that since our suggested procedure estimates a direct causal effect omitted 
variable bias is no longer a concern, and for identification purposes there is no need to 
control for additional covariates or municipality fixed effects.
8 We will however include 
year fixed effects to control for any aggregate shocks such as, e g, inflation that affects 
all jurisdictions in the same way. 
In order for the estimated coefficient to represent a causal effect, the instrument 
needs to be valid (i e relevant and exogenous). The relevance of the excluded instrument 
can be examined by looking at the t-statistic and its associated p-value for the parameter 
on the excluded variable in the first-stage estimation. How to test for exogeneity of the 
instrument is not obvious. What we will do is to use three different approaches to 
examine the exogeneity of the instrument. This will be further discussed in section 6. 
                                                 
8 The assumption that no additional covariates are needed will be examined when checking the exogeneity of the 
instrument. See section 6 for more details. 
10  IFAU – Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power 3 Institutional  background   
3.1  Local governments in Sweden   
Decentralized governments in Sweden are among the largest in the world, with a 
comprehensive range of responsibilities, for example primary education, child care and 
care for the elderly. The provision of these services is very labor intense and roughly 20 
percent of the entire work force is employed by the municipalities, making them the 
largest employer in the country. As a consequence, costs for personnel make up more 
than half of municipal expenditures. The most important source of municipal revenue is 
a proportional local income tax which makes up 60–70 percent of total revenues. The 
rest is made up of fees and grants. Since equalization is a major feature of the grant 
system, the importance of grants as a source of revenue varies substantially over 
jurisdictions, and the average figure is just above 15 percent. But there are also three of 
the municipalities in the region of Stockholm that actually were net contributors to the 
system during the entire 1996–2004 period. 
A major grant reform in 1993 replaced a system of targeted central government 
grants to all municipal services (education, child and elderly care, social services and 
infrastructure) by a general lump-sum grant. This meant that the majority of grants were 
no longer ear-marked. After some early changes the new system that came into place in 
1996 consisted of income-equalizating grants, cost-equalizing grants and a general per 
capita grant, all distributed as general lump-sum grants. The cost equalization aimed at 
reducing differences in structural cost conditions across municipalities, whereas the 
purpose of income equalization was to bring per capita tax revenues close to the 
national average.
9 It is worth noting that the same grant system prevailed during the 
entire period studied in this paper. 
3.2  Do bureaucrats have any political power? 
The Swedish constitution establishes that “all public power in Sweden proceeds from 
the people”, and that one of the means to the realization of this is independent local 
                                                 
9 Both of the equalizing grants are self-financed by equal per capita contributions from all municipalities. 
IFAU – Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power  11  
 
governments.
10 However, it is not explicitly spelled out what is exactly meant by 
“independent local governments”. Formally, decisions in the local governments are 
taken by the political majority in the municipal council. In reality, however, far from all 
questions are under the influence of the politicians. Like in politics in general, a lot of 
issues are so complex or require so many detailed decisions that it is better to leave the 
preparation and/or implementation to local officials. This means that a great portion of 
the actual power potentially lies in the hands of the bureaucracy. In Sweden this is even 
more likely on the local than on the central level, since the vast majority of the seats in 
the municipal council are held by unpaid leisure politicians, who also have full-time 
occupations.  
The way that one has thought about the role of politicians on the one hand and that of 
bureaucrats on the other has varied over time in Sweden.
11 For a long period it was 
considered best that all decisions were made by politicians and that the bureaucracy was 
a pure implementing institution. As the number and complexity of the decisions that had 
to be made grew, the old system got increasingly difficult to maintain. In the 1980’s, 
when economic problems began to pile up in many municipalities, it was argued that 
things would run more efficiently if more power were put in the hands of local officials. 
The idea was that politicians were to decide what to do, while the bureaucrats decided 
how to do it. In practice it is however often more or less impossible to draw the line 
between the two. In a survey of local politicians, 30 percent thought that the division of 
responsibilities between politicians and bureaucrats is unclear and more than 50 percent 
felt that the role as a politician simply was to approve proposals made by officials 
(SKL, 2005). Although the views that were expressed in this survey may not be 
representative of the entire country
12, the lack of power that these politicians 
experienced lend support to the argument that bureaucrats have power in the local 
decision-making process. 
                                                 
10 See the Instrument of Government, chapter 1, article 1. 
11 For a discussion on this, see, e g, Montin (2002). 
12 The survey was voluntary and only 17 municipalities took part in it. 2,204 out of 3,188 recipients responded, i e a 
response rate of 69 percent. The entire survey is published in SKL (2005). 
12  IFAU – Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power 4 Data   
In this paper we use a panel of 279 municipalities observed over the time period 1996–
2004.
13 As mentioned in section 2, the grant formula that is used for identification is an 
element of the cost-equalizing grants designed to compensate local governments for 
additional costs due to large out-migration. During the period 1996–2004, the average 
out-migration grant as a fraction of total cost-equalizing grants for eligible munici-
palities amounts to around 18 percent, whereas the cost-equalizing grants for eligible 
municipalities amount to around 20 percent of total grants. As described previously, 
jurisdictions with net out-migration below two percent do not receive any out-migration 
grant whereas those above two percent do. Over the studied period, 112 municipalities 
never received any out-migration grants, 55 municipalities received grants all nine years 
and the remaining 112 municipalities received grants some, but not all years. As can be 
seen from the map in Figure 2 the receiving municipalities are all over the country, even 
though they are concentrated in the north of Sweden. 
 
                                                 
13 The dataset covers all municipalities except for eight that were affected by consolidations (Bollebygd, Borås, 
Lekeberg, Örebro, Nykvarn, Södertälje, Knivsta and Uppsala) and three that have responsibilities that the other 
municipalities do not have (Gotland, Malmö and Göteborg). 
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Table 1 gives summary statistics for the two grants variables (cost-equalizing grants and 
migration grants, both measured per capita), the dependent variables (personnel in the 
central administration (i  e bureaucrats) 
14 and personnel in child care, schools, and 
elderly care, measured in full-time equivalents per 1,000 capita) and the treatment-
determining covariate (net out-migration).
15 The motivation for choosing to compare 
the results for the bureaucrats with personnel in child care, schools, and elderly care is 
that these three sectors are the largest and have traditionally been the most important 
ones. The large standard deviations relative to the means and the negative minimum 
values of cost-equalizing and migration grants reflect the fact that the grant system is 
                                                 
14 Note that the categorization into different types of personnel used throughout the paper is such that the entire staff 
of bureaucrats works in the municipal administration office and does not include, for example, the superintendent of a 
school (who is categorized as school personnel). 
15 It is worth noting that the net out-migration rate that determines whether or not a municipality is eligible is taken 
from register data. There is hence no room for the municipality to manipulate the figures in order to become eligible 
for the grants. 
14  IFAU – Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power self-financed. As for personnel, most people are employed in elderly care and schools – 
21 and 17 full-time equivalents per 1,000 inhabitants, respectively.  
 
Table 1 Summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Variable Mean  St  dev  Min  Max 
Personnel, central administration  5.48  1.13  2.19  12.86 
Personnel, child care  10.55  1.72  3.33  17.90 
Personnel, schools  16.71  2.71  8.45  32.09 
Personnel, elderly care  21.20  6.66  1.48  41.11 
Cost-equalizing grants  532.1  2,452  -3,471  13,196 
Migration grants  111.7  286.8  -125.5  1,384 
Net out-migration  -0.789  7.92  -42.95  16.64 
Wages, bureaucratic personnel 20,039  2,353  15,094  28,657 
Wages, personnel in child care  15,995  1,708  12,458  20,514 
Wages, personnel in schools  20,055  1,937  16,075  25,092 
Wages, personnel in elderly care  15,608  1,545 12,621  20,965 
Share of population 0–6  0.079  0.013  0.047  0.128 
Share of population 7–15  0.122  0.012  0.068  0.164 
Share of population 80+  0.054  0.014  0.012  0.091 
Population 27,229  48,884  2,575  761,721 
Tax base  105,957  19,219 69,399 256,754 
Share foreign born  0.040  0.027  0.006  0.291 
# of observations  2,511 
Notes: Grants and tax base are defined in SEK per capita. Personnel are defined as number of full-time 
equivalents per 1,000 inhabitants and wages are defined as the average monthly salary of a full-time 
equivalent. Net out-migration is given in percent. Data is obtained from Statistics Sweden and from The 
Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions. 
 
Table 1 also presents the socio-economic variables that will be used in an approach to 
test the exogeneity of the instrument (see section 6.2). These variables are wages paid to 
municipal employees, share of population aged 0–6, share of population aged 7–15, 
share of population aged 80 years or older, population size, the per capita tax base, and 
the share of foreign-born citizens. There are large variations across municipalities in 
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these variables as well as in the amount of migration (which of course is the underlying 
reason why there is a need for equalization). 
5  The effects of grants on municipal personnel 
in different sectors 
In this section we will present the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates of the model 
presented in equations (3) and (4) to examine whether grants, on the margin, have a 
different impact on the number of bureaucrats than on other types of personnel. In order 
to test whether the instrument is relevant, we first present the results from the first stage. 
Thereafter, we turn to the estimates of the causal effects from the second stage. 
5.1 First-stage  estimates 
Since there might exist direct effects of the treatment-determining covariate on 
personnel, we need to control for a flexible function of this covariate in order for the 
instrument to be valid. One might worry that when doing this, there will be no 
explanatory power left in the instrument, which thereby will fail to be relevant. Whether 
this is the case or not will be clear from the first-stage estimates, more precisely from 
the p-values of the estimate of the partial correlation between the formula for the out-
migration grant ( ( ) (, 2 ) (, 1 2 ) it it m −− − Ω ) and total cost-equalizing grant ( , it g ). This estimate 
corresponds to  1 γ  in the first-stage regression given in equation (3). If  1 γ  is statistically 
significant we know that after controlling for the direct effects of the smooth function in 
net out-migration, the out-migration grant still has an impact on total cost-equalizing 
grant, implying that our instrument is relevant. 
Since we do not know the form of the direct effects of the treatment-determining 
covariate we wish to be as flexible as possible. Therefore, we use up to a 4
th order 
polynomial in net out-migration. Table 2 shows the first-stage estimates and associated 
standard errors of  1 γ  in equation (3). The standard errors are robust to arbitrary residual 
16  IFAU – Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within municipality.
16 Each row corresponds to 
estimation with a 2
nd, 3
rd or 4
th order polynomial in  ( ) f ⋅ . 
 
Table 2 First-stage estimates. 
Dependent variable:  Cost-equalizing grants 
2
nd order polynomial  3.251*** 
(0.778) 
3
rd order polynomial  3.697*** 
(1.134) 
4
th order polynomial  4.866*** 
(1.443) 
# of observations  2,511 
Notes: The table presents estimates of γ1 in the first-stage equation (3). Robust standard errors 
adjusted for within cross-sectional serial correlation in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 
the 1 percent level. Time dummies and smooth functions with out-migration in 2
nd-4
th order 
polynomial are included in the estimations. 
 
From the table it is clear that all estimates are highly significant in a statistical sense. 
We can also note that the economic significance (the magnitude of the point estimate) is 
increasing over the order of polynomials in the smooth function. If anything, the 
instrument hence gets stronger the more flexible the control function is. The overall 
conclusion is that the instrument works well in the sense that it is relevant. Next we turn 
to the two-stage least square estimates of the causal effect of grants on municipal 
personnel. 
5.2 Two-stage  least squares estimates 
Table 3 presents the 2SLS estimates of  1 α  from equation (4) for four different types of 
municipal personnel: bureaucrats, personnel in child care, personnel in schools, and 




th order polynomial in  () f ⋅ . Since the measurement units of the dependent variable 
(personnel per 1,000 capita) and the variable of interest (total cost-equalizing grants per 
                                                 
16 Rigidities in hiring and firing suggest that there is a time-lag in employment, which is also shown to be the case in 
Bergström et al (2004). This emphasizes the importance of adjusting the standard errors accordingly. This is done 
using the cluster command in STATA. 
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capita) are very different, the variables are rescaled to have a zero mean and a standard 
deviation of one in order to facilitate the interpretation of the estimated parameters.  
To start with the results for bureaucrats, it is clear from the first column in Table 3 
that grants have a positive and statistically significant effect on the number of 
bureaucrats employed by the municipality. Since the point estimate is somewhat 
affected when going from a 2
nd to a 3
rd order polynomial in the treatment-determining 
covariate (increasing from 0.62 to 0.87), but is mainly unaffected when going from a 3
rd 
to a 4
th order polynomial, this is an indication that a 3
rd order polynomial in the 
treatment-determining covariate is flexible enough to control for the direct effect of out-
migration on the number of bureaucrats. The estimates for the two highest-order 
polynomials are around 0.85. The interpretation of this figure is that a one standard 
deviation increase in grants leads to a 0.85 standard deviation increase in bureaucrats 
per capita, which must be considered an economically significant effect. Without the 
rescaling the analogous effect is that a 100 SEK per capita increase in grants leads to an 
increase of 0.03 full-time equivalent bureaucrats per 1,000 capita, which is around 0.5 
percent of the mean. Again, this is a substantial effect considering that the mean of the 
absolute value of the cost-equalizing grants is around 1,500, implying that 100 SEK 
constitute a 6–7 percent increase.
17 
According to Dahlberg et al (forthcoming) increased intergovernmental grants lead 
to increased municipal spending Krona for Krona. The effects we see for bureaucrats 
might therefore not be that extraordinary – the money has to go somewhere, and since 
the services municipalities supply are labor intense we would expect to see increases in 
the number of personnel. Consequently, we would also expect to find similar effects in 
the other sectors of the municipal labor market. If, however, the effects on other types of 
personnel are unambiguously smaller than the effects on bureaucratic personnel, our 
result is an indication that bureaucrats use their power in the local decision-making 
process to their own advantage by allocating a larger share of additional grants to 
themselves. We therefore proceed by looking for similar effects in three of the most 
                                                 
17 Because of the equalizing feature of the grants more than half of the observations on cost-equalizing grants are 
negative. This implies that evaluating the size of a grant increase in the context of the mean value from Table 1 would 
be misleading. 
18  IFAU – Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power important sectors in local public employment, namely child care, schools, and elderly 
care. 
The resulting 2SLS estimates of  1 α  are presented in the last three columns of Table 3. 
The results are quite striking – none of the estimates are statistically significant. This is 
not due to larger standard errors but to smaller point estimates. It thus seems like the 
number of personnel in child care, schools, and elderly care are unaffected by a 
marginal increase in grants to the municipality. 
 
Table 3 Effects of grants on bureaucrats and personnel in child care, schools and 
elderly care. 2SLS estimates. 
Dependent variable:  Bureaucrats  Personnel in  
child care 
Personnel in  
schools 
Personnel in  
elderly care 
2


























# of observations  2,511  2,511  2,511  2,511 
Notes: The four columns report standardized estimates of α1 in the second-stage equation (4) with 
dependent variable bureaucrats, child care, elderly care and school personnel, respectively. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for within cross-sectional serial correlation in parentheses ***, ** and * denotes 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Time dummies and smooth functions with out-migration in 
2
nd-4
th order polynomial are included in the estimations.  
 
Let us summarize the results in Table 3. We have found that, on the margin, grants 
increase the number of bureaucrats in the central administration, but do not have any 
effects on other types of personnel. The conclusion is that the effects we see on 
bureaucrats are in line with the hypothesis that they have an independent say in the 
decision on what to do with additional grants, and that they use this power to increase 
the number of fellow bureaucrats. By employing more people in the central 
administration they are likely to be better off in the sense that their own workload 
decreases. Also, the size of the bureau is increased. Of course, it could also be that the 
politicians wish to employ more bureaucrats to decrease their workload, or that the 
bureaucrats believe that it is also in the interest of the voters to have many bureaucrats. 
These interpretations do however seem less likely given, for example the survey 
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evidence discussed above saying that more than half of the politicians that answered the 
survey felt that their role as a politician simply was to approve proposals made by 
officials (see SKL, 2005). Another potential explanation could be that the grants 
themselves increase the need for an administration handling the distribution of these 
grants. However, we believe this to be quite far-fetched, given that the grants arrive 
with no strings attached and that there is no application procedure in place. 
The conclusion drawn above hinges crucially on the validity of the instrument. From 
the first-stage estimates presented earlier, we saw evidence of instrument relevance. But 
does the instrument really provide an exogenous variation? We will in the next section 
examine in depth whether the assumption of exogeneity is fulfilled. 
6  Is the instrument valid? 
For the instrument to be valid it needs to be both relevant and exogenous. The first-
stage estimates in section 5.1 show that the instrument is indeed relevant. To examine 
whether our instrument also provides an exogenous variation, we will use three different 
approaches; (i) a graphical analysis to examine, visually, if the smooth function  ( ) f ⋅  
that should control for any direct effects of out-migration is doing its job, (ii) adding 
additional covariates to our baseline specification to see how sensitive the estimates are 
to this (the point estimates should not be much affected if the instrument is truly 
exogenous), and (iii) using an additional discontinuous rule to test, by means of the 
Hansen  J test, the model specification/instrument validity by utilizing the over-
identifying restriction. 
6.1 Graphical  analysis 
Our identifying assumption is that, once we have controlled for smooth functions of the 
treatment-determining covariate, we have controlled for all direct effects of this 
covariate on the outcome. Any remaining relationship between the outcome variable 
and the net out-migration variable should then come from the grant formula, implying 
that there should not be any correlation between the two variables for net out-migration 
rates below two percent (if anything, there should only be a relationship between the 
20  IFAU – Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power two variables for a net out-migration rate of two percent or more). To examine whether 
this is indeed the case we estimate the second step equation (4), but leave out the 
predicted grants variable. We thereafter plot the residuals from that equation against net 
out-migration. What we would like to see then is a zero relationship between the two 
variables for those municipalities that have not been treated (i e, those municipalities 
with a net out-migration rate below two percent). As a comparison, we also do this 
without controlling for any direct effects in order to see the raw correlations between the 
net out-migration rate and the outcome variable (deviations from mean). 
Figure 3 shows the predicted residuals from the following two regressions 
 
(5)  ,0 it it y , α ε =+  
(6)  () , 0 (, 2 ) (, 1 2 ) , ; it it it it yf α ε −− − =+ + m δ , 
 
where y is municipal personnel and  ( ) f ⋅  is a 4
th order polynomial in the historic out-
migration rate.
18 We see from the figure that there seems to exist a relationship between 
municipal personnel and net out-migration when we do not control for the treatment-
determining covariate (using the residuals from equation (5)), but that the relationship 
more or less disappears for those municipalities that have not been treated when 
controlling for a 4
th order polynomial in net out-migration (using the residuals from 
equation (6)). We interpret this as evidence that our control function is flexible enough 
to control for any direct effects of net out-migration on municipal personnel, validating 
our instrument.  
 
                                                 
18 In the figures we show the relationship between the two variables for those municipalities with a net out-migration 
rate larger than -20 percent and lower than 10 percent. This constitutes the mass of the observations. The reason for 
excluding some municipalities with extreme out-migration rates is that they are so few and that the locally weighted 
regressions used in constructing the estimates in the figures are sensitive to the number of observations within the 
bandwidth.  
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Since we argue that our method estimates a direct causal effect similar to that in an 
experimental setting, there is, except for efficiency reasons, no need to control for any 
additional covariates. If, however, the point estimates change when controlling for 
additional covariates, the plausibility of exogeneity must be questioned. We will 
therefore check whether the point estimates from the baseline IV regression are 
sensitive to the inclusion of additional covariates. The idea is that if the point estimates 
are insensitive to controlling for observables, then they should also be insensitive to the 
inclusion of unobserved variables hidden in the error term, that is, the omitted variable 
bias is likely to be quite small. Our choice of control variables are wages for municipal 
employees, tax base per capita, total population, share of population aged 0–6, share of 
population aged 7–15, share of population aged 80+, and share of foreign-born citizens, 
all of which can be suspected to affect municipal personnel. 
The second column in Table 4 presents 2SLS estimates of  1 α  from equation (4) when 
including the additional covariates.
19 For expositional purposes we only present the 
estimates from a specification with a 4
th order polynomial in the net out-migration rate. 
The first column reproduces the baseline estimates from Table 3.  What one should look 
for are possible differences between the point estimates in the two columns. Doing that, 
we see that the results are fairly robust – there is a slight decrease in magnitudes but 
there is still a substantial effect of around 0.7 for bureaucrats and still no effect on the 
other types of municipal personnel. These results support the view that the instrument 
provides an exogenous variation.  
 
                                                 
19 It should be noted that the first-stage estimates from these regressions are virtually unchanged compared to those 
from the baseline regressions presented in Table 2 and we do therefore not report them. 
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Table 4 2SLS estimates when including additional covariates. 


















# of observations  2,511  2,511 
Notes: The four rows report standardized estimates of α1 in the second-stage equation (4) with dependent 
variable bureaucrats, child care, school, and elderly care personnel, respectively, with additional 
covariates (in the second column) average wages, tax base per capita, total population, share of 
population aged 0–6, share of population aged 7–15, share of population aged 80+, and share of foreign-
born citizens. Robust standard errors adjusted for within cross-sectional serial correlation in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Time dummies and smooth functions 
with out-migration in 4
th order polynomial are included in the estimations.  
 
6.3  Testing overidentifying restrictions using an additional 
discontinuity 
The most common way to test for instrument validity is to use some test for 
overidentifying restrictions (like the Hansen J test). Since the baseline model is exactly 
identified, this approach is not viable for us. However, in the year 2000 an additional 
discontinuous component was introduced in the cost equalization where municipalities 
were compensated also for the change in the number of school-aged children. This 
compensation was conditioned on the net out-migration rate during the past three years 
(with a two year lag,  ), which had to be larger than two percent. 
Municipality i thus received additional out-migration grants in year t ( ) according 
to the following rule: 






(7)          
(, 2 ) (, 5 ) (, 2 ) (, 5 ) ,
,
0 if   0 and   2
0 otherwise









24  IFAU – Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power where   is the net change in the number of school-aged children in municipality 
i between year t and year t-j.
(,) (, ) it it j s −−
20 That is, for the shorter time period 2000–04, we have 
two discontinuous grant rules; the rule in equation (2) and the rule in equation (7). As a 
third approach to investigate the exogeneity of the instrument, we will make use of the 
additional grant formula and re-estimate our model with two instruments for the shorter 
time period.
21 Thereafter we can conduct the Hansen J test of instrument 
validity/correct model specification.
22 
For the period 2000–04, the first stage is now given by 
 
(8)  () ( ) ( ) , 0 1 ( ,2 ) ( ,1 2 ) 2 ( ,2 ) ( ,5 ( ,2 ) ( ,1 2 )










−− − −− − −− −
−− −








where   is the grant rule given in equation (1),   is the 
grant rule given in equation (7), and 
( (, 2 ) (, 1 2 )
m
it it m −− − Ω ) () (, 2 ) (, 5
s
it it s −− − Ω
( ) f ⋅  and  ( ) h ⋅  are smooth functions of the 
treatment-determining covariates. The h-function plays a similar role as the f-function, 
i  e it controls for any direct effects that the change in the number of school-aged 
children might have on local personnel. Thus, the arguments in  ( ) h ⋅  are 2
nd–4
th order 
polynomials in the change in school-aged children. The second-stage counterpart to 
equation (8) is then given by 
 
(9)  ( ) ( ) , 0 1 , (, 2 ) (, 1 2 ) (, 2 ) (, 5 , ˆ ;; it it it it it it it yg f h α αε −− − −− − =+ + + + ms δλ , 
 
where   is predicted grants given by the estimation of equation (8).  ˆ g
 
                                                 
20 During 2000–01, this compensation was based on changes in the age group 7–15 and in 2002–04 on changes in the 
age group 7–18. The mean of the school grants variable is 9.7 SEK per capita with a standard deviation of 60.3 
(minimum value is -10.2 and maximum value is 752.1). The mean of the net change in the number of school-aged 
children is 2.65 percent with a standard deviation of 4.08 (minimum value is -10.25 and maximum value is 23.59). 
21 As noted in the introduction the identification strategy in this paper is a version of the one in Dahlberg et al 
(forthcoming). They did not, however, separate the two discontinuities into two instruments and were thus not able to 
test any overidentifying restrictions. 
22 Worth noting is that the Hansen J statistic really tests whether several distinct instruments result in the same 
estimate. To rely on the Hansen J as a test for instrument exogeneity one therefore has to assume i) that one of the 
instrument is exogenous and ii) homogenous treatment effects. 
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Starting with the first-stage estimates, it is clear from the results presented in Table 5 
that both instruments are relevant – for any order of polynomial in the treatment-
determining covariates, both  1 γ  and  2 γ  are significantly different from zero at the five 
percent level. Turning to the second-stage estimates, presented in Table 6, it can be 
noted that according to the Hansen J-statistic, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of 
valid instruments/a correct model specification for any of the outcome variables when 
using a 3
rd or 4
th order polynomial. Hence, also the third test indicates that our 
instrument is exogenous.  
It is also interesting to see that we for this shorter time period and with two 
discontinuous grant rules as excluded instruments get very similar results (both with 
respect to the point estimates and significance levels) as in the baseline specification. 
This strengthens our conclusion that marginal increases in grants increase the number of 
bureaucrats, but not the number of personnel in child care, schooling and elderly care. 
 
Table 5 First-stage estimates when using two discontinuous rules. 
Dependent variable:  Cost-equalizing grants 
Excluded instrument:  Migration grants  School grants 
2














# of observations  1,395 
Notes: The table presents estimates of γ1 and γ2 in the first-stage equation (8). Robust standard errors 
adjusted for within cross-sectional serial correlation in parentheses. *** and ** denotes significance at the 
1 and 5 percent level. Time dummies and smooth functions with out-migration and change in school-aged 
children in 2
nd-4
th order polynomial are included in the estimations. 
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# of observations  1,395  1,395  1,395  1,395 
Notes: The four columns report standardized estimates of α1 in the second-stage equation (9) with 
dependent variable bureaucrats, child care, elderly care and school personnel, respectively. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for within cross-sectional serial correlation in parentheses. Hansen J-statistic and 
[p-value] in italics. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Time dummies 
and smooth functions with out-migration and change in school-aged children in 2
nd-4
th order polynomial 
are included in the estimations. 
 
To sum up the results from the fairly thorough check of instrument validity provided in 
this section, we think that we can be quite confident in the exogeneity of the instrument 
and, hence, in the baseline results presented in section 5.  
7  What type of bureaucrats is employed when 
grants increase? 
The pool of personnel in the central administration, as we have defined it so far, is fairly 
broad. It includes everyone from employees in more basic administrative services to 
high officials and heads of local public authorities. With unique access to register data 
on all individuals employed by the municipalities we are however able to refine our 
analysis by studying the lower and upper part of the distribution of influential 
bureaucrats separately. This will tell us something about what type of bureaucrats that 
gets hired when the municipality employs more personnel after a marginal increase in 
grants. 
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Once again equation (4) is estimated, with dependent variables now being 
administrative personnel and high officials respectively, and the resulting  1 α  estimates 
are shown in Table 7. From there it appears as increases in employment take place 
among those which one would think are the least powerful in local politics, as opposed 
to among high officials. With a 4
th order polynomial in the smooth function, a one 
standard deviation increase in grants leads to around one half standard deviation 
increase in administrative personnel. Or, equivalently, an increase in grants of 100 SEK 
leads to around 0.013 more full-time equivalents per 1,000 capita, which is close to 1.5 
percent of the mean for this personnel category. 
 
Table 7 Effects of grants on different types of bureaucrats. 2SLS estimates. 
Dependent variable:  Administrative personnel  High officials 
2














# of observations  2,476  2,511 
Notes: The two columns report standardized estimates of α1 in the second-stage equation (4) with 
dependent variable being administrative personnel and high officials, respectively. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for within cross-sectional serial correlation in parentheses. ***, ** and * denotes significance at 
the 1, 5 and 10 percent level. Time dummies and smooth functions with out-migration in 2
nd–4
th order 
polynomial are included in the estimations.  
 
How well does this finding correspond to the idea that bureaucrats use their power over 
the decision-making process to achieve selfish goals? If such power exists, it is likely 
that it is the high officials that possess the power, not the administrative personnel. We 
can think of a couple of possible reasons for why high officials would use their power to 
employ more administrative personnel instead of more high officials. First, the number 
of positions for high officials is probably quite restricted – an institution can have only a 
certain amount of directors. This restricts the scope for new appointments. Second, a 
large staff of administrators will be able to cover a variety of tasks that would otherwise 
be assigned to someone further up the ladder. Hence, by employing more administrative 
28  IFAU – Intergovernmental grants and bureaucratic power personnel, the high officials can reduce their own work load. Finally, having a large 
staff of administrator also increase the number that the higher officials are bosses over, 
which gives them more power.  
8 Concluding  remarks 
Bureaucrats pursuing own selfish goals may cause a discrepancy between what elected 
representatives intend to do and what is actually being done – a discrepancy that 
ultimately means that the implemented policy will be different from the one that voters 
desire. Due to factors such as asymmetric information and difficulties in measuring 
output, monitoring bureaucratic behavior is very problematic. To find empirical support 
for the hypothesis that bureaucrats self-interestedly pursue own goals is even more 
difficult, since the nature of such behavior implies that, if undertaken, they would 
probably put in effort to avoid people finding out about it. In this paper we have 
suggested and applied one way of testing this. Making use of a discontinuity in the 
Swedish grant system we are able to estimate causal effects of intergovernmental grants 
on personnel in different local government sectors and compare the effects across 
sectors. The pattern of results is quite clear – the marginal effects of additional grants on 
bureaucratic employment is significant and large, while there is no significant effect on 
the number of personnel in child care, schools, or elderly care. This is a pattern that we 
interpret as indicating that bureaucrats have an independent say in the decisions on what 
to do with additional grants, and that they use this power to achieve selfish goals. In 
addition, the variety of ways in which the validity of the instrument is examined and 
verified indicates that the discontinuous grant indeed is a good instrument, so we can be 
quite confident that the estimated results represent causal effects and not only 
correlations. 
It should be noted that an alternative interpretation of the presented pattern of grants 
effects on personnel in different sectors is that it is the politicians, not the bureaucrats 
themselves, who want to have a larger bureau to assist them in their work. We cannot 
separate between these two explanations. However, some indication that it is in fact 
bureaucrats rather than politicians that desire a large administrative sector is survey 
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evidence in SKL (2005); as mentioned in the paper, more than half of the local 
politicians that took part in a survey investigation in 2005 felt that the role as a 
politician simply was to approve proposals made by bureaucrats. 
Also, we cannot exclude that bureaucrats choose to increase the administrative staff 
because they think that this actually is the best use of the extra grants from the voters’ 
perspective. It is, however, hard to believe that voters would prefer more bureaucrats 
rather than, e g, more teachers or a larger nursing staff. 
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